Compromised infotainment, then pivot to the bus
Enter through the connected screen, then jump all the way to critical functions.
A modern vehicle is a dozen computers talking over the same wire. Pick an attack: see where it gets in, how it travels, and what a defence actually blocks.
In 2025, 92% of attacks are carried out remotely.67% go through telematics, cloud or APIs.
Top-down view. Four domains, one network, joined by the central gateway. The identifiers and frames shown are teaching examples.
Thirty attacks, from the CAN bus to Ethernet and charging.
Enter through the connected screen, then jump all the way to critical functions.
Each defence has a precise scope. Turn one on and watch what changes on the schematic.
Without segmentation, the pivot crosses the gateway and reaches the brakes. SecOC would change nothing here if the attacker emits valid commands.
Infotainment exposes remote interfaces (cellular, Wi-Fi). A flaw there gives a foothold; if segmentation is insufficient, the attacker reaches the bus and physical functions.
Everything hinges on compartmentalisation. Since the CAN identifier is not a sender address, a node that reaches the critical bus can emit anything on it. The gateway is the only thing that can deny passage from one domain to another.
The path runs through the gateway from the antenna to the brakes, which come under control.
Families 1 (back-end), 5 (connectivity) and 2.
Jeep Cherokee 2015: remote takeover via Uconnect, reaching steering and brakes. 1.4 million vehicles recalled.