How to attack a car.

A modern vehicle is a dozen computers talking over the same wire. Pick an attack: see where it gets in, how it travels, and what a defence actually blocks.

In 2025, 92% of attacks are carried out remotely.67% go through telematics, cloud or APIs.

bus traffic 1 240 fr/s
CENTRALGATEWAYECMengineTCMtransmissionADAScamera + radarABS / ESPbrakingSRSairbagsCombineinstrument clusterPEPSkeyless entryBCMbody / cabinIVIinfotainmentTCUtelematics 4GGNSS / V2XOBD-II / DoIPdebug / JTAGRF key / PKESCCS chargingUSB / BT-WiFicellular / OTA / backend
PowertrainChassisBodyInfotainmentAttack path

Top-down view. Four domains, one network, joined by the central gateway. The identifiers and frames shown are teaching examples.

Catalogue

Thirty attacks, from the CAN bus to Ethernet and charging.

Reconnaissance and the CAN bus
UDS diagnostics
Entry points and telematics
Modern in-vehicle networks
Hardware and charging
C2 — layer C

Compromised infotainment, then pivot to the bus

Enter through the connected screen, then jump all the way to critical functions.

Target : ABS / ESPSegmentation

Replay the attack with a defence on

Each defence has a precise scope. Turn one on and watch what changes on the schematic.

PASSES

Without segmentation, the pivot crosses the gateway and reaches the brakes. SecOC would change nothing here if the attacker emits valid commands.

Technical detail

Principle

Infotainment exposes remote interfaces (cellular, Wi-Fi). A flaw there gives a foothold; if segmentation is insufficient, the attacker reaches the bus and physical functions.

Why it works

Everything hinges on compartmentalisation. Since the CAN identifier is not a sender address, a node that reaches the critical bus can emit anything on it. The gateway is the only thing that can deny passage from one domain to another.

Method

  1. Exploit the IVI remotely via the cellular interface
  2. Reach the microcontroller connected to the bus (the IVI's second core)
  3. Cross the gateway for lack of inter-domain filtering
  4. Inject the command onto the chassis bus

Prerequisites

  • Remote access (cellular/Wi-Fi)
  • An application flaw in the IVI
  • Weak segmentation

Simulated effect

The path runs through the gateway from the antenna to the brakes, which come under control.

Mitigations

  • Strict segmentation by gateway, inter-domain filtering
  • Hardening and updating of the IVI
  • IDS on the critical buses

Tools (reference)

  • reference: Miller & Valasek, Jeep Cherokee 2015

UNECE R155 Annex 5

Families 1 (back-end), 5 (connectivity) and 2.

Real-world case

Jeep Cherokee 2015: remote takeover via Uconnect, reaching steering and brakes. 1.4 million vehicles recalled.