Glossary
Car hacking glossary
Every term of automotive hacking, defined simply and linked to the pages of the site. The network, the ECUs, diagnostics, the tools and the attacks, from the CAN bus to the seed-key.
The onboard network
- CAN bus
- Controller Area Network. The car's nervous system: a single shared wire on which every ECU broadcasts its messages, with no sender or recipient address.
- Frame
- The message unit of the CAN bus. It carries an identifier, a length and up to eight data bytes. Everything that travels on the bus is a frame.
- Arbitration ID
- The number at the head of the frame. It names not a recipient but a subject, and also serves as priority: the lower it is, the sooner the frame gets through.
- Arbitration
- The rule that decides which frame gets through when two ECUs speak at once. The dominant bit beats the recessive one, with no collision and no loss.
- Dominant and recessive bit
- The two states of the bus. The dominant one, a zero, overwrites the recessive one, a one: that is the physical mechanism behind arbitration and behind the bus-off attack.
- CAN FD
- CAN with flexible data rate. An evolution of the CAN bus carrying up to sixty-four bytes per frame and a higher rate, increasingly common on recent vehicles.
- LIN
- Local Interconnect Network. A slow, cheap bus for comfort functions, windows or mirrors, often linked to the CAN through an ECU.
- Automotive Ethernet
- A fast network layer, 100BASE-T1 or BroadR-Reach, for heavy streams: cameras, ADAS, updates. It coexists with the CAN on modern architectures.
- Bus-off
- The state an ECU falls into after too many errors, going silent. Triggered on purpose, it silences a legitimate ECU: a denial-of-service attack.
- The CAN bus explainedstructure of a frame and arbitration
- The frame decoderhandle a frame signal by signal
The ECUs
- ECU
- Electronic Control Unit. One of the car's computers. A modern sedan has several dozen, one per major function: engine, braking, cabin.
- Gateway
- The central ECU that links the different buses and filters what passes from one to another. A key control point, and a prime target for crossing domains.
- BCM
- Body Control Module. The cabin ECU: lighting, doors, wipers. Often the pivot between comfort and sensitive functions.
- PEPS
- Passive Entry Passive Start. The keyless entry and start system. Convenient for the user, and an attack surface for theft by amplification.
- Immobilizer
- The device that stops the engine from running without the right key. Bypassed, it opens the way to starting a stolen vehicle.
- DBC file
- The dictionary that translates raw frames into named signals, speed or engine rpm. Manufacturer-specific, it is the holy grail of reverse engineering: with it, the bus becomes readable.
- CAN bus reverse engineeringfind a signal without a DBC file
Diagnostics
- OBD-II
- On-Board Diagnostics. The standard socket under the wheel and the protocol that goes with it. Meant for servicing, it gives direct access to the bus.
- DoIP
- Diagnostics over IP. Diagnostics carried over Ethernet instead of CAN, faster, used for large reprogramming jobs and increasingly exposed.
- UDS
- Unified Diagnostic Services. The standard diagnostic language, ISO 14229: read faults, read data, reprogram an ECU. Powerful, therefore sensitive.
- Service (SID)
- A UDS command, named by one byte, the Service Identifier. For example 0x22 to read a data value, 0x27 for secured access.
- DID
- Data Identifier. The two-byte number that names a precise data value to read or write in UDS, such as the serial number, the VIN.
- DTC
- Diagnostic Trouble Code. A fault code stored by an ECU. It is what the mechanic reads when the engine light comes on.
- Seed-key (0x27)
- The secured access of UDS. The ECU sends a challenge, the seed, the tool must return the right answer, the key. A weak algorithm, and the door opens.
- Diagnostic session
- A mode you put the ECU into to unlock certain commands. The extended or programming session gives access to the most sensitive.
- Flash (reprogramming)
- Rewriting an ECU's software. The most sensitive operation in diagnostics: poorly protected, it lets you install a modified firmware.
- UDS and the seed-key explainedthe 0x27 service step by step
The tools and practice
- SocketCAN
- The CAN stack of the Linux kernel. It makes a bus, real or virtual, appear as an ordinary network interface that every tool can use.
- vcan
- A virtual CAN interface, entirely in memory. The ideal sandbox: you practise with no car and no hardware, nothing leaves the machine.
- candump
- The tool that shows every frame on the bus, live. The first reflex of reverse engineering: see what is flowing.
- cansniffer
- A view that shows only the bytes that change. Perfect for isolating the signal that moves when you trigger an action.
- cansend
- The tool that sends a frame picked by hand. It is what you use to forge and replay a frame on the bus.
- canplayer
- The tool that replays a recording of frames identically. The basis of the replay attack.
- ICSim
- Instrument Cluster Simulator. A fake dashboard that reacts to a real CAN bus. The classic training ground, without a car.
- Fuzzing
- Sending malformed or random frames to provoke abnormal reactions and flush out flaws. A blind but effective exploration.
- Sniffing
- Listening passively to the bus to understand its traffic, without sending anything. The first, quiet step of any analysis.
- Install the toolscan-utils, ICSim, SavvyCAN
- Build your first ICSim labstep-by-step tutorial
- The toolboxcatalogue sorted by use
The attacks and the defences
- Replay
- Capturing a legitimate frame then sending it back as is. The simplest attack: the bus does not check who is speaking.
- CAN injection
- Emitting fake frames on the bus to command a function. Behind the recent thefts through the headlight or the bumper.
- Relay attack
- Extending the range of the contactless key by relaying its signal. The car believes the key is near, and opens.
- Spoofing
- Passing for a legitimate ECU by emitting in its place. With no authentication on the bus, it sees nothing wrong.
- Denial of service (DoS)
- Saturating the bus or forcing an ECU silent, bus-off, to cut a function. No theft, but a car that no longer responds.
- SecOC
- Secure Onboard Communication. The fundamental countermeasure: every message carries a signature, a MAC, and a freshness counter. Replay and spoofing fall.
- Segmentation
- Walling off the buses by domain and filtering at the gateway. An attack on the infotainment no longer reaches braking.
- HSM
- Hardware Security Module. A dedicated chip that keeps the keys and does the cryptography. The hardware bedrock SecOC and signed flashing rest on.
- CAN bus reverse engineeringthe method in two workshops
- The analysesreal hacks, taken apart
Frequently asked questions
- What is the CAN bus in one sentence?
- A shared network where every ECU in a car broadcasts its messages on a single wire, without checking who is speaking. That trust by default is what makes it an attack surface.
- What is the difference between OBD-II and UDS?
- OBD-II is the socket and the servicing protocol, standard and public. UDS is the deeper diagnostic language, reading and reprogramming, that runs over that socket, far more powerful.
- What is the seed-key?
- The secured access of UDS diagnostics, the 0x27 service: the ECU poses a challenge, the tool must return the right answer. When the algorithm is weak, the protected access falls.
- What is CAN injection?
- Emitting fake frames on the bus to command a function, for example to unlock or start. It is the principle of the recent thefts through the headlight.
- Where to start learning?
- With a virtual bus and ICSim, no car and no hardware. The guide installs the tools, and the ICSim tutorial runs a first attack step by step.